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INTRODUCTION
It has been noted that “[CJonstitutional supremacy is one of the splendid 
achievements of North American and European legal culture.”' This “achievement” 
has of late been exported to countries in the developing world, and the past two 
decades have witnessed a proliferation of constitutionalism in newly-democratized 
countries of Africa, Eastern Europe and elsewhere. Indeed, across the legal and 
political spectrum, it is currently the conventional wisdom that a democratic society 
cannot function without a constitution, or at least an entrenched system of 
constitutional review. Legal and other scholars, in this new age of 
constitutionalism, argue that constitutionalism is a precondition for democracies to 
flourish.^
The field of comparative constitutionalism has grown exponentially in the past two 
decades, and particularly since the end of the Cold War. Of worthy note is the 
ascendancy of bills of rights, and the concomitant explosion of constitutional 
review. Although entrenched in the United States since the landmark case of 
Marbury v Madison^ (seen as the gold standard for judicial review), and also well- 
established in Europe in the post-World War 2 era, especially in the fonnation of 
the European Court of Human Rights, the notion of judicial review is of recent 
vintage for most of the developing world. Although bills of rights have been around 
at least since the beginning of the decolonization period in Africa and elsewhere, for 
the most part they have been dormant, until a revival since 1989, generated by the 
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. It has been argued that as the language 
of rights increasingly replaced the language of redistribution, bills of rights and the 
rhetoric of rights, became the “lingua franca of progressive politics”,'* and that in 
fact this language began to supplant “all other ethical discourses”.’
The project of constitutionalism therefore raises key questions: How should a 
constitution regulate human relationships? How does a constitutional framework 
embody shared values whilst at the same time recognizing minority derogations 
from such values? How does the constitution balance competing rights claims? 
How are the constitutional values internalized by the broader citizenry? Regarding 
the field of comparative constitutionalism, further questions are generated: What 
relationships do national constitutions have to their foreign counterparts? What 
analogies and distinctions can be extracted from comparative constitutional 
frameworks? How are national constitutions impacted by the global legal context 
within which they operate? Does constitutional governance strip the elected 
legislature of its central role of governance?
These were some of the questions raised at the conference entitled 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVES,* held at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa in 
December 2005. As the title of the conference suggested, the purpose was to 
explore comparative perspectives on rights enforcement, despite a diverse array of 
political, economic, cultural and legal contexts. The purpose was to engage some of 
the theoretical debates pertaining to the project of rights enforcement in a 
constitutional context, but also to engage in analyses of rights enforcement at an 
empirical level. The contributors to this volume bring to the discussion a host of 
questions, both standard and unique ones, regarding the project of constitutional 
governance and the enforcement of rights.
They demonstrate in their respective chapters the growth of the field of comparative 
constitutionalism, pointing out the relationship between the theoretical discourse 
mostly found in academic writing, on the one hand, and the organic and exciting 
movements for change generated by civil society, on the other. They also analyze 
the contested nature of rights incorporation and enforcement, and in particular the 
multi-layered and contested nature and context of legal interpretation.
In the first section of the volume, Dwight Newman argues, in the opening chapter, 
that comparative constitutionalism, thus far grounded in substantive and moral 
considerations, can be enriched by attention to procedural norms. Describing 
“process” as the “human bridge between justice and peace”, Newman sees “rich 
possibilities” in such an exploration, choosing as his point of illustration the use of 
international law in the process of domestic constitutional interpretation. This 
focus, he argues, will highlight the issues raised by a comparative approach to 
normative constitutional processes. Unproblematic in the South African context, 
where the Constitution there mandates consideration of international law, but highly 
vexed in the USA, on both legal and political grounds, he suggests a framework that 
allows for a principled incorporation of international law. His approach respects the 
normative evolution of domestic constitutional law, whilst at the same time allowing 
the comparative constitutional project to permit a “principled intermingling” of local 
and international law. Although unclear as to the final result of this incorporation, 
that is, an improvement in domestic constitutional interpretation, or the opposite, 
Newman nonetheless argues that the process may generate methodological 
possibilities of enormous benefit to the project of comparative constitutionalism.
In his thoughtful chapter, Michael Plaxton explores the distinctions between 
constitutional rules and prophylactic rules, arguing that such distinction allows 
lawyers and legal scholars to “make better sense” of constitutional cases and 
doctrines. Plaxton argues that such distinction may also “clarify the relationship” 
between the legislative and judicial branches, particularly in the contemporary 
climate of accusations and counter-accusations of “judicial activism”. Plaxton 
believes that although caution should be applied in the use of American 
constitutional jurisprudence, that occasional borrowing of American legal concepts 
may “bring order to constitutional thinking”.
Taunya Banks wades into the increasingly contentious waters that concern the 
incorporation and justiciability of socio-economic rights. She notes that the 
jurisprudence on civil and political rights in the United States has resulted in a 
court-sanctioned hierarchy of rights, namely fundamental versus non-fundamental 
rights, and that the Court’s balancing of these rights do not always lead to 
consistency or predictability. In short. Banks argues that these neatly categorized 
hierarchy of rights are not absolute. She cites, for example, the seminal decision of 
the United States Supreme Court in Brown v Board of Education,’ in which the 
court jettisoned a fundamental right like the freedom of association, in favor of one 
that prioritized equality under the law.
She argues for the inclusion of socio-economic rights in constitutional frameworks, 
even though they may test the balancing capacity of courts even more, and may 
raise difficult separation of powers issues. Banks argues that the normal process of
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creating a hierarchy of rights, and the concomitant balancing required of courts, will 
merely .incorporate another set of rights, namely socio-economic ones. Evaluating 
the socio-economic rights jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court, 
she is sanguine that the vexed questions raised by the incorporation of socio­
economic rights in national constitutions need not tip the balance against legislatures 
ultimately retaining the control over state expenditure.
Martin Chanock, utilizing the metaphor of “cutting and sewing”, explores the many 
endeavors at constitutional democracy in post-colonial Africa, and particularly the 
disappointing results of such endeavors. By linking the “conceptual worlds of 
political science and law, Chanock anaylyzes the wave of “constitutional revival” in 
post independence Africa. Chanock laments the fact that bills of rights and judicial 
review have superceded notions of political accountability, separation of powers and 
the rule of law in the project for constitutional democracy. Arguing that the latter 
processes are actually the “primary core” of constitutional democracy, not least of 
which because so few of Africa’s peoples “speak or are ^literate in the languages of 
constitutions, bills of rights and constitutional discourse”. In fact, Chanock argues 
that for Africa’s citizens, the “rights language” is “literally meaningless”.
Using his deft skills of historical reflection, Chanock engages in a chronological 
narrative of post-colonial constitution making in Africa. In this account, he pays 
particular attention to the current concern with “failed states”, a preoccupation with 
contemporary rule of law and good governance projects, the “explosion” of 
constitutional drafting in the wake of the end of the cold war, and the emergence of 
the contemporary global moment of free markets and diminished state oversight. 
Chanock ultimately reduces his chapter to the central question of the future of 
constitutional democracy in Africa, namely, “where to” and “how to”.
The next section examines the issue of separation of powers and the role of the 
judiciary in the enforcement of rights. It begins with a discussion by Brian 
Flanagan who raises the issues of judicial review, and whether the 
constitutionalization of economic rights is appropriate to protect minorities. Notiiig 
the ideological polarization that the constitutional enforcement of socio-economic 
rights generates, he suggests a model for addressing the justiciability of economic 
rights on the basis of protecting welfare interests on moral grounds, one that may be 
accepted outside of ideological boundaries. Kirsty McClean, in her chapter 
continues the discussion on socio-economic rights by examining decisions of the 
Canadian Supreme Court and that of the South African Constitutional Court 
involving the right to health care. She locates her questions within the concept of 
“constitutional deference” in evaluating the decisions the judges reach.
Denise Meyerson explores the “complex connections between the doctrine of 
separation of powers and the rule of law”. She argues that the “separation of 
judicial from executive and legislative power” furthers the rule of law because it 
places “the adjudication of controversies’ in the judiciary that “can be relied upon to 
adjudicate disputes independently and impartially”. This argument leads her to 
question the approach taken by South African and Australian courts “to the exercise 
of non-judicial functions by judges”, an approach that she believes is too “flexible 
and does not serve to protect the rule of law, and in fact contradicts the very aim of 
the doctrine of separation of powers. Meyerson therefore suggests that a “blanket
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prohibition” on non-judicial functions should be placed on judges as a means of 
protecting judicial independence.
Focusing on the limitation of a constitutional right, Grégoire Webber engages in an 
analysis of the concept of a “dialogue” between the judiciary and the legislature, in 
which he frames the issue of the “dialogic exchange” between the two as one of 
“justification”. He draws on the Canadian constitutional model to explore the 
evolving concept of “public law as a culture of justification”. He sees the Canadian 
experience as relevant for other démocratie societies that also incorporate 
limitations clauses in their constitutional arrangements.
Ruthann Robson explores the question whether judicial review is “advantageous for 
women’s sexual freedom”, and in particular, “lesbian sexual freedom”, and 
therefore, as a practical matter, whether feminists and lesbians embarking on a 
project of sexual freedom should “embrace” judicial review. Noting the 
contemporary significance of this question today as new constitutions are being 
drafted, she suggests ways that advocates of sexual freedom can conceptualize, to 
their advantage, the question of judicial review.
Section Three focuses on constitutionalism, citizenship and identity. It also pursues 
questions of eonstitutions and gender equality, and particularly how a constitution 
can best further women’s rights, both in the public and private sphere. International 
and national law historically have conceptualized all forms of domestic violence as 
a private matter, outside the scope of state regulation. Valerie Vojdik's chapter 
reviews the treatment of domestie violence under international law, and then 
contrasts the approaches of the United States Supreme Court and the South African 
Constitutional Court. These two courts have taken dramatically different approaches 
to domestic violence under their respective constitutions. The U.S. Supreme Court 
has resisted efforts to constitutionalize a right to be protected from domestic or 
gender-motivated violence. In contrast, the Constitutional Court has held that the 
Constitution imposes affirmative obligations on the state to guarantee a woman’s 
right to be free from violence, and national domestic violence legislation fulfills the 
state's constitutional obligation to afford women gender equality and other 
fundamental rights. Such affirmative obligations are also reflected in the socio­
economic rights incorporated in the South African Constitution. This reflects an 
understanding of gender based violence as fundamental to gender inequality.
In her chapter Qudsia Mirza provides a feminist analysis of the complex relationship 
between issues of race, ethnicity, gender, religion and law in eontemporary Britain. 
This analysis is placed within the context of the revival of certain forms of religious 
conservatism and the discriminatory attitudes that such conservatism often entails. 
Mirza points out that this nexus is especially pertinent for Muslim women who 
suffer oppression in terms of growing Islamophobia in society, and the increased 
exposure of ‘fundamentalist’ Islam. She describes a ‘hierarchy of oppression’ that 
Muslim women face in seeking legal remedies, with the unenviable task of choosing 
between different forms of disadvantage. Muslim women face discrimination within 
their communities on the basis of entrenched, conservative interpretations of 
scripture. Mirza examines the encounter between English law and Shari’a law 
which indicates that both legal cultures are being influenced by each other. She 
concludes that dramatic changes are being effected to Muslim practice as a result of
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rchanges imposed by English law, particularly in the area of gendered rights. She 
cautions that the law can become a tool by which inequalities are perpetuated 
leading to discrimination against Muslim women as a ‘minority within a minority’. 
This provides lessons to other jurisdictions where increasing conflict of laws 
impacts adversely on women’s equality rights.
Janet Calvo emphasizes that even in an increasingly globalized world, citizenship is 
an important basis for the protections of rights. She observes that there has been 
insufficient and inadequate attention paid to the constitutional protection of the right 
to citizenship. However, in a globalized world, changing borders and increased 
migration, citizenship acquisition has become increasingly controversial. There is 
now substantial scholarship that analyzes citizenship beyond that which is defined 
by a nation state. Yet citizenship continues to matter, she argues, as the world is still 
predominately organized by, and into, nation states. Even with unprecedented 
mobility for individuals, basic rights depend on the acquisition of citizenship in a 
nation state. Calvo reviews the various contemporary forms of citizen acquisition, 
before arguing that the "right" to citizenship is often the foundational right upon 
which other "rights" are based. The right to citizenship is "the right to have rights." 
But the formal acquisition of citizenship does not always mean full access to 
constitutional rights, and Calvo illustrates that there are many historical and current 
instances of second class citizenship imposed on people because of race, ethnicity, 
gender, and sexual orientation.
Calvo argues that constitutions should be clear and detailed about the nature of 
citizenship and its attendant bundle of rights. The character of this contemporary 
period of globalization, and the complexities that it generates with respect to 
citizenship, birth, descent and consent, and the growing occurrence of multiple 
nationalities, raises complex and contradictory questions. Calvo concludes with a 
strong recommendation that nation states should pursue more consistent norms with 
respect to citizenship, and that there is an urgent need for international standards 
that seriously address the issue of statelessness.
Craig Lind's shares his decade long preoccupation with elucidating the interaction 
between cultural norms and legal family regulation. He uses examples of same sex 
family regulation and polygamous family regulation in several jurisdictions, but 
primarily in South Africa. How does the legal system cope with real, lived, family 
forms which the many, if not a majority, in a particular society would prefer not to 
see embraced? And what effect does this interaction of law with family norm have 
on the lived family lives and the individual self-identities of those living in 
multicultural societies? Lind's inquiry seeks to reflect critically on some alternative 
strategies that appear to be available to the legal system in regulating the family 
where cultures come into conflict on the issue of family form. He pays particular 
attention to the fundamental rights discourse that serves as the background to legal 
reflection on the issues raised.
He is very concerned about the place of law in structuring the social world, and he 
offers us some extremely thought provoking questions about the difficult places we 
have reached in relation to the regulation, especially under democratic 
constitutionalism, of cross cultural family norms. If it is true that one of the values 
ascribed to multiculturalism is its contribution to the way in which we critique our
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own view of the world, our ambition for family regulation and gender equality 
should not be that it is transformed to satisfy the prescripts of one culture, but that 
we should be more reflective of our norms and their comparative success at 
resolving the problems that arise in our societies. Culturally foreign norms shine a 
different light on social practices and they cause us to see our practices in the light 
of others. They remind us that there are other ways of seeing the world and that each 
way provides, not complete answers to dilemmas, but answers that are partial and, at 
best, suit their cultural context.
Wendy Pettifer's chapter focuses on the loss of a human rights culture in the United 
Kingdom. Basing her analysis on her experience as both a legal aid practitioner and 
a clinical educator in the area of refugee and asylum law, she reviews the position of 
the incoming Labour Party as they prepared for government in their last days of 
opposition, when passage of the Human Rights Act was the centrepiece of the 
party's vision of a just and fair society. Pettifer sees the Prime Minister Tony Blair's 
recent foreign policy misadventures as the end of that vision. She looks at the 
passage of the Human Rights Act, which incorporated the provisions of the 
European Convention on Human Rights into United Kingdom domestic legislation, 
examining the political background within which incorporation took place.
In exploring constitutionalism and economic justice in the next section, the speakers 
raise the possibility of utilizing bills of rights to pursue economic equity, focusing 
niost of their attention on litigating in pursuit of socio-economic rights on behalf of 
disadvantaged communities. They also explore the range of socio-economic rights 
that are, in fact, suitable for incorporation in constitutional texts.
Rebecca Bratspies persuasively argues that the most. pressing environmental 
challenges, namely, global climate change, loss of biodiversity, desertification, 
destruction of the ozone layer, the spread of toxics and pollutants throughout the 
world, are beyond the capacity of any single state to resolve. No nation can, by 
itself, create a healthy environment. Constitutional environmental provisions are 
certainly a start, but they are no more than that. Although such constitutional 
provisions may be a necessary part of a global response, they are not, in and of 
themselves, sufficient. Recognizing this, however, Bratspies argues that by setting a 
baseline of agreed rights for individuals, and by including environmental rights as a 
critical counterweight to the right of development, constitutional environmental 
provisions can play a crucial role in developing more propitious conditions for that 
cooperation. She illustrates that alongside a growing body of domestic and 
international law governing environmental protection, there has been an 
unmistakable trend towards recognizing a right to a healthy environment. Almost 
every Constitution drafted or revised in the past 20 years has included an express 
textual recognition of the right to environmental protection.
In her chapter Susan Herman notes that rights discourse can overstate the role of 
judicially-enforced constitutional rights in effectuating change, while critiques of 
rights discourse can understate the role of the judiciary in implementing 
constitutional commitments. As many of the authors in this volume point out, the 
tension between these two views are often emphasized in comparison between the 
Constitutions of South Africa and the United States. Several of the authors in this 
volume question the extent to which the South African courts can truly be effective
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in ensuring the fulfillment of commitments to socio-economic rights. Another issue 
discussed throughout this volume is what, if anything, the South African courts can 
glean from the experiences of other countries in answering these difficult questions. 
Some argue that there is nothing relevant in the experience of the United States 
because the United States Constitution does not guarantee socio-economic rights at 
all. Herman cautions that this is an overly hasty dismissal of a potentially useful 
comparison. She argues that the experiences of the United States after the Civil 
War, and of South Africa after the end of apartheid, show that even a profoundly 
transformative event may not result in a lasting societal commitment to follow 
through on promised changes. In drafting a constitution, framers may accurately 
express their constituents' altruistic intentions to help the victims of slavery or of 
apartheid to build new lives. But when the personal costs of living up to that 
commitment become apparent, political will can and usually does dissipate. Self- 
interest, partisan politics, and inertia can all erode the inclination of political actors 
to live up to earlier promises. It is for that reason that both countries, after 
transformative and wrenching events, embodied their deeply held beliefs in a 
constitution and assigned the responsibility for interpreting that constitution to 
politically insulated courts. Herman answers some of her co-authors whether 
judicial involvement in socio-economic matters can be justified by stating that the 
presumption should be reversed. If a constitution confers socio-economic rights, 
whether explicitly or implicitly, we should have to provide justification for 
excluding one branch of our government from the conversation about the meaning 
of those rights.
Peggy Maisel and Susan Jones review the role of South African legal education in 
the implementation of the social and economic promise of the Constitution. Progress 
towards social and economic justice is South Africa's greatest challenge, 
complicated by the catastrophic HIV/AIDS pandemic. As noted elsewhere in this 
volume, the South African Constitution recognizes socio-economic rights as a 
necessary foundation for the enjoyment of civil and political rights. The challenge is 
translating these rights into opportunities for social and economic advancement by 
the vast majority of South Africans living in poverty - how do we make 
Constitutional rights “lived rights”?
Arguably, Maisel and Jones note, lawyers are among the most highly educated 
professionals in every society, needed to support and lead the transformation away 
from poverty and inequality by helping to actualize these constitutional provisions. 
Law students must learn about how law can be used as a tool to promote, rather than 
inhibit, social and economic development and they must gain the skills, values, and 
knowledge to assist. Under apartheid, law schools educated lawyers to maintain a 
system of subordination. Maisel and Jones identify ways in which legal education 
must continue to change in order to educate lawyers who are able to assist with 
South Africa's development. They analyze the contributions of clinical legal 
education since apartheid and some of the obstacles to its growth. It is also ironic 
that fewer and fewer law students are choosing to enter any form of public interest 
law, as the remuneration cannot compete with either government or the private 
sector. This very issue, the decline in human rights legal education in South Africa, 
was a topic very much on the agenda of the conference itself that gave rise to this 
volume.
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In the concluding section of the volume, Patrick Kelly focuses on the emerging 
debate between democratic constitutionalists and populist constitutionalists about 
the appropriate institutions to engage in constitutional interpretation. In the United 
States., South Africa and other democracies with constitutions that require judicial 
interpretation, courts have assumed the role of final constitutional authority under 
the doctrine of judicial supremacy. Populist constitutionalists argue that the elected 
branches of government, more reflective of popular will, should dominate 
constitutional interpretation. Kelly is concerned that the constitutionalization of 
rights has expanded the role of the judiciary, thereby transferring issues of rights 
articulation and distributive justice from a democratic process to the courts. In this 
debate between adherents of constitutional democracy, on the one hand, and 
populist constitutionalism, on the other, there is an overlooked dynamic affecting 
the articulation of rights and the allocation of resources. Kelly poses the question as 
to what extent and by what processes international legal norms should be 
incorporated into domestic constitutions. He raises several concerns about the 
democratic legitimacy of many international legal norms and about the wisdom of 
the importation of international legal norms into domestic law.
Steve Ellmann enquires into the nature of war powers under the South African 
Constitution. He admits that this might at first glance appear a rather strange 
enquiry, since South Africa, certainly the post-apartheid South Africa, does not 
locate itself as a “war power”. However, Ellmann argues that comparatively 
speaking, particularly in relation to other African nations. South Africa is a “well- 
armed state”, and that in any event. South Africa is deeply immersed in 
peacekeeping activities in troubled regions of Africa including the Congo, Burundi 
and Darfhr. He therefore explores what the Constitution provides for with respect to 
the issue of war. He concludes that the brevity of the constitution’s provisions is 
testament to the belief of the nation’s founding fathers and mothers, in the notion of 
peace in the wake of the brutality and violence of apartheid. In his chapter he 
analyzes the specific provisions that pertain to war and emergency powers, and 
posits hypothetical situations to outline what the South African government is 
enabled within its constitutional mandate of human rights and democracy.
In his chapter Christopher Gale analyzes the recent anti-terrorism legislation in the 
United Kingdom within a broad human rights framework. He reminds us that, again 
and again, when legislation is enacted hastily in response to a new and urgent 
situation, there is little questioning of the principles underpinning the issue the 
legislation is supposed to address. Governments around the world have used the 
9/11 attacks as an opportunity to review anti-terrorism laws and security procedures. 
Indeed, as part of its own immediate response, the United States Congress hastily 
passed the Patriot Act. The United Kingdom followed suit by promulgating various 
anti-terrorism statutes. Gale argues that the legislation will contribute to far 
reaching infringements of civil liberties that may impede, rather than further, 
attempts to curb international terrorism.
Gale poses the question of why the fundamental matter of charging terrorists with 
specific offences has not been addressed expeditiously? He notes that because of 
their secretive and covert nature, allegations of involvement in terrorism are difficult 
to investigate. However, to subject individuals to such indeterminate restraints of
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liberty flagrantly violates due process rights. Gale is concerned that the current state 
of emergency in the United Kingdom appears unlikely to end in the near future, and 
that the “additional powers” provided to the government will continue to violate the 
due process rights of those arrested. Gale sees this as an indictment of Britain’s 
status as a “liberal democracy".
Paul Brietzke begins his chapter, the final one in the volume, with the metaphor of 
the common law of tort that "every dog gets its first bite," since dogs are not deemed 
inherently vicious. But once that dog has bitten, its owner becomes strictly liable to 
prevent future bites; the dog is then said to have a known vicious propensity. 
Brietzke evocatively postulates that even giving the hierarchy of the United States 
military and intelligence network that involves private contractors and a civilian 
hierarchy, the benefit of the doubt, by treating it as not inherently vicious, this 
hierarchy has now bitten so hard, so often, and in so many contexts since September 
11, 2001 that the owner is clearly obliged to take the strictest of precautions. In a 
democracy, the ultimate owner of this beast is the American people, but they can 
only exert control through the president, his bureaucratic hierarchy. Congress, the 
courts, the ballot box, and/or an activist media and civil society networks. 
Continued savagery under the rubric of torture shows the failure of such 
accountability devices that otherwise guarantee civilized behavior in mature 
democracies. Brietzke therefore argues that alternatives must be pursued to call 
these known vicious propensities to account.
As noted in this chapter by Brietzke, as well as in this volume by Pettifer and Gale, 
for both Prime Minister Blair and President Bush, the second Iraqi War is a 
passionately-held belief, desperately in search of a saleable moral justification. 
Brietzke concludes with Burke’s clarion warning call; "All that is necessary for the 
triumph of evil is that good men [and women and institutions] do nothing". 
Brietzke concludes that the anti-democratic foundations of a strong and military 
state will continue to threaten Americans.
We are grateful to the authors of these chapters for their journey to South Africa to 
present them. Their thoughtful perspectives on the issues raised in this book 
provided the inspiration for this volume. We particularly want to thank Yasmin Tabi 
(CUNY School of Law Class of 2007), and Shuva Paul, Shalini Deo and Heather 
Muwero (CUNY School of Law Class of 2008) for their assistance in checking 
footnotes and references, and formatting the papers for us. We especially want to 
thank Wendy Stoffels for her exceptional organizational skills in ensuring that the 
conference in Durban ran smoothly. A special thanks as well to Dean Mike 
Cowling, Associate Dean John Mabuganzi, and faculty members at the Howard 
College School of Law for their participation in, and their support for, the 
conference. A special thanks to Dean Brent Cotter of the University of 
Saskatchewan College of Law and faculty members who presented papers at the 
conference. We are grateful to Chief Justice Pius Langa for introducing the issues 
covered in this volume in the foreword. This has been a collaborative process for 
the two co-editors; working together has been intellectually rewarding, and always 
fiin. We are indebted to each other in countless ways.
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